The Modus Vivendi of Persons with Schizophrenia: Valueception Impairment and Phenomenological Reduction

So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two aspects of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the modus vivendi of schizophrenia. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception impairments in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia interfere with the intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the intersubjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As a consequence, the modus vivendi of schizophrenia, in my opinion, is not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but goes in a different directio

Hunger for Being Born Completely. Plasticity and Desire

The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such hunger that directs human positioning into the world

Schelling come precursore dell’antropologia filosofica del Novecento

Searching for the origins of 20th century Philosophical Anthropology, it is quite common to follow the suggestions of A. Gehlen who points to Herder as such an origin. In this study, however, I propose a rather different, until now scarcely considered hypothesis: the origin of Philosophical Anthropology can be brought back to Schelling’s reflections concerning Kant’s Critique of Judgement and the problem of self-organization of nature. Starting from his critical observations on Kant, Schelling works out the concept of a succession of levels in the organic, and that of the ex-centricity that defines human beings. Exactly these two concepts will be discussed by Scheler in The Human Place in the Cosmos and by Plessner in The Stages of the Organic and Man. It is commonly assumed that Schelling did not exert any direct influence upon Philosophical Anthropology; one usually allows only for an indirect influence on Scheler, intermediated by Eduard von Hartmann. This paper shows, however, that a documentable, direct influence of Schelling on Scheler can be demonstrated, and that it was decisive for the birth of Philosophical Anthropolog

Hunger for Being Born Completely.Plasticity and Desire.

The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as \u201chunger for being born completely\u201d (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such a hunger that directs the human positioning into the world

Periagoge - Theory of Singularity and Philosophy as an Exercise of Transformation

This book returns to the question at the center of our existence, a question that the narcissistic culture in which we are immersed systematically tends to remove: “Why?” The underlying thesis is that the answer must not be sought in success or social recognition, but in a “fragment of truth”, hidden somewhere inside each of us, which reveals itself only if we detach ourselves from our ego and its certainties. It is not, therefore, a matter of finding yet another philosophical theory of the meaning of existence, but rather of shedding light on the conditions under which such meaning can emerge. The author shows us that the ultimate source of our existential orientation lies in the affective sphere, and that the current crisis of orientation is derived from the atrophy of the process of affective maturation on a large scale, and from a lack of knowledge and experience about which techniques are best to reactivate it. We are like glowworms that had once unlearned how to illuminate and have since begun to hover around the magic lantern of the ascetic ideal, already criticized by Nietzsche, and then around neon advertising signs. We are glowworms that have forgotten that we have within our own affective structure a precious source of orientation. The basic thesis is that this source of orientation can be reactivated through the care of desire and practices of emotional sharing

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO THE EXISTENCE OF HUMAN BEING

The analysis of mental disorders necessarily requires careful and multilayered reflection. Psychiatry is indeed focused on complex phenomena and symptoms that can be only partly traced back to merely quantitative objectifiable data. This is the reason why we witness a growing methodological and conceptual \u201cmutual enlightenment\u201d between philosophy and psychiatry. Whereas philosophy offers notions that can help to take into account also the qualitative aspects and the lived experiences of pathologies, clinical psychiatry seems to represent one of the most relevant practical fields for philosophy to test its explan- atory capacity in relation to its many important issues. The history of phenomenological psychopathology, in particular, shows that philosophers have demonstrated a keen interest in the practical consequences of these issues in the field of clinical psychopathology

DIE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES ORDO AMORIS IN DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS UND BIN KIMURAS

In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients in relation to a disturbance on the level of the “minimal self”. Subsequently, the discussion has highlighted the importance of disorders on the level of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity (Thomas Fuchs) and on the level of “existential feelings” (Matthew Ratcliffe). This paper argues that Max Scheler and Bin Kimura allow us to focus on an aspect which has been neglected so far: that of a “relational self” that relates to the very foundation of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality and that can thus be reborn in the encounter with the other and may position itself differently in the world. In Scheler’s perspective, the world of persons with schizophrenia is the result of an axiological disorder (valueception) that impairs contact with the primordial life impulse (Lebensdrang). As a consequence, they are incapable of attuning emotionally and socially with others: this prevents the singularity from being reborn in the encounter with the other and forces them to position themselves in their own solipsistic universe. Moving in a similar direction, Bin Kimura interprets the world of persons with schizophrenia as the result of a disorder of aida (one of the central concepts of Japanese culture that indicates the space of being in between). The disorder of aida compromises the basic relationship (Grundverhältnis in the sense of Viktor von Weizsäcker) and hinders what Bin Kimura calls festum, i.e. the birth of subjectivity, so that it is experienced by persons with schizophrenia only as ante festum. Starting from these two perspectives, I argue the existence of an axiological and anthropogenetic dimension of psychopathology. I begin with a discussion of Zahavi’s concept of minimal self and the thesis that reveals the disorders on this level of subjectivity as the origin of the world of persons with schizophrenia. I, then, analyze Max Scheler’s position and its historic importance for the emergence of phenomenological psychopathology. Thereafter, I introduce the concepts of “disorder of aida” (Bin Kimura) and “disorder of ordo amoris” (Max Scheler). Finally, I develop the concept of a “psychopathology of ordo amoris” by also comparing it with Ratcliffe’s thesis of “existential feelings”

Biosemiotica e psicopatologia dell'ordo amoris. In dialogo con Max Scheler

Che cosa consente l\u2019interazione fra due organismi o la comprensione del vissuto altrui? Finora le teorie dell\u2019embodiment, dell\u2019intersoggettivit\ue0 e dell\u2019empatia sono spesso partite da un presupposto individualistico (la comprensione dell\u2019altro \ue8 successiva alla comprensione di s\ue9 stessi) e cognitivista (la dimensione affettiva \ue8 successiva al processo cognitivo). La tesi di questo libro \ue8 che all\u2019origine non ci sono due entit\ue0 isolate che successivamente interagiscono. Piuttosto c\u2019\ue8 una falda impersonale \u2013 l\u2019affettivit\ue0 originaria (Gef\ufchlsdrang) \u2013 che rende tutti gli organismi viventi fin dall\u2019inizio costitutivamente sintonizzati con il piano espressivo della vita. La proposta \ue8 quella di ripensare la tematica della corporeit\ue0 sulla base di una biosemiotica dell\u2019interazione fra corpo vivo (Leib) e ambiente (Umwelt). Le emozioni umane si rivelano dispositivi che sperimentano livelli di sintonizzazione ulteriori e che, proprio perch\ue9 ex-centrici, espongono l\u2019umano al rischio di alienarsi nelle varie forme di esistenza psicopatologia. Si tratta d\u2019una prospettiva inedita, che si rivolge alla psicopatologia per rileggere in controluce la filigrana che intesse la struttura della singolarit\ue0 personale. Quello che emerge \ue8 un territorio d\u2019indagine intermedio fra la filosofia e la psichiatria: la psicopatologia dell\u2019ordo amoris. Il testo si confronta con la tradizione della psichiatria e della psicopatologia fenomenologica del Novecento (Jung, Jaspers, Minkowski), con l\u2019attuale dibattito fenomenologico sull\u2019intersoggettivit\ue0 (Gallagher, Zahavi) e con quello psichiatrico sulla schizofrenia come disturbo dell\u2019aid\ue0 (Kimura) o come processo di disembodiment (De Jaegher, Fuchs, Stanghellini). Il risultato rappresenta la prima ricerca sistematica, a livello internazionale, sulle ricadute dei concetti scheleriani di \uabschema corporeo\ubb (Leibschema) e \uabordine del sentire\ubb (ordo amoris) in ambito psicopatologico e filosofico

Katharsis. La morte dell'ego e il divino come apertura al mondo nella prospettiva di Max Scheler

Dalla Prefazione di Manfred Frings: «Il libro di Guido Cusinato non solo riesce a mettere in evidenza la molteplice rilevanza della filosofia di Scheler […], ma illumina anche nuovi aspetti e apre nuove prospettive di indagine. Questo obiettivo viene raggiunto da Cusinato con rigore metodologico e attraverso uno sforzo teso a verificare tutta una serie di affermazioni che erano state fatte finora in modo forse un po’ troppo affrettato. Per es. dimostra che Scheler non era né un dualista né un panteista, come invece spesso si è sostenuto […] Cusinato offre al lettore elementi finalmente efficaci per rivedere parecchi luoghi comuni. In particolare Cusinato ritiene importante, mettere da parte quella categoria interpretativa del “dualismo” fra spirito e vita, che così spesso è stata invece applicata alla sua metafisica. Al suo posto Cusinato suggerisce di intendere la concezione scheleriana della relazione fra spirito e vita, o meglio, fra spirito e pulsione (Geist e Drang), facendo ricorso ad un termine che compare negli ultimi scritti: quello di interpenetrazione (Durchdringung). […] Fra le analisi che Cusinato svolge […] le più preziose e originali mi sembrano essere quelle relative all’umiltà (Demut). Invece nella maggior parte della letteratura su Scheler l’umiltà, uno dei tre atti morali fondamentali per accedere all’atteggiamento filosofico, non viene neppure menzionata. L’interpretazione che ne dà Cusinato, ponendola a fondamento di una «riduzione catartica» pensata in contrasto con la consueta riduzione husserliana, offre senz’altro spunti promettenti per le indagini future» (M. S. Frings, Prefazione, in: G. Cusinato, Katharsis, pp. 6-7)

La fenomenologia e le affordances espressive dei dati di fatto puri

Ci\uf2 che la psicologia chiama "Affordance" ha un ruolo centrale per ci\uf2 che la fenomenologia tedesca chiama "dato di fatto